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I.

INTRODUCTION

The exploding market for books of all kinds in the form of digital files (“ebooks”), which can be read on mobile devices and personal computers, has
attracted aggressive competition between the two leading online e-book retailers, Amazon, Inc. (“Amazon”) and Apple Inc. (“Apple”).1 While both Amazon
and Apple have been accused by critics of engaging in anticompetitive practices with regard to e-book sales,2 the U.S. Department of Justice has focused on
Apple. In 2012, federal prosecutors brought an antitrust suit against Apple and
five of the nation’s largest book publishers—HarperCollins Publishers LLC
(“HarperCollins”), Hachette Book Group, Inc. and Hachette Digital
(“Hachette”); Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a Macmillan (“Macmillan”);
Penguin Group (USA), Inc. (“Penguin”); and Simon & Schuster, Inc. and
(“Simon & Schuster”) (collectively, the “Publisher Defendants”)3—for colluding in violation of the Sherman Act to raise the retail prices of e-books.4 Each
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1
Complaint at 2–3, United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 12 CV 2826) [hereinafter Complaint].
2
Charles E. Schumer, Memo to DOJ: Drop the Apple E-Books Suit, WALL ST. J., July
17, 2012, at A15.
3
See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. Random House, Inc. is the other one of the six
largest publishing companies, but was not named as a defendant in either the Justice Department’s case or the parallel class action suit. See id. (United States Justice Department’s
case); see also In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 671, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(parallel class-action lawsuit).
4
Complaint, supra note 1, at 7, 31–32.
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of the Publisher Defendants has settled, leaving Apple the sole defendant in a
case that was tried in the Southern District of New York in June of 2013.5 That
trial resulted in a finding that Apple did conspire with the Publisher Defendants to raise the price of e-books, and an order of injunctive relief was granted
against Apple.6 The Justice Department’s decision to prosecute Apple and the
Publisher Defendants has been strongly criticized by Apple, as well as
booksellers, authors, lawmakers and policy groups on the grounds that the ebook-selling leader, Amazon, is the real anti-competitive culprit.7 Apple and
the publishers argued that their actions had supplied consumers with alternative purchase options and had protected consumers from Amazon’s “monopolistic grip” over the publishing industry,8 evidenced by the company’s 90%
market share of e-book sales.9
This Note examines the history of the Sherman Act and explains why that
history led to the DOJ’s litigation against Apple, but not against Amazon. Additionally, this Note proposes policy changes for antitrust prosecutions in markets that may have been tainted by a monopoly or market failure, prior to the
anticompetitive practices being prosecuted. Part II discusses the history of
Sherman Act jurisprudence. Part III lays out the recent trend toward a strict
economic basis for antitrust enforcement and the implications of that trend.
Part IV discusses the case by the Justice Department against Apple and Apple’s defense at trial. Part V examines the arguments made by the critics of the
Apple case. Finally, Part VI recommends policy changes to address the conflict
between the prosecution of Apple and the failure to prosecute Amazon.
5
United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia also joined the Justice Department as plaintiffs in the
suit. Id.
6
Id. at 709.
7
Andrew Tangel, Apple Denies Conspiracy on E-book Prices; Antitrust Trial Opens
with U.S. Attorneys Saying Firm’s Scheme Cost Readers Millions, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2013,
at B2; Salman Rushdie, Status, TWITTER (Mar. 9, 2012, 2:13 PM),
http://commcns.org/1iSrVy0 (“Seems that the US Justice Dept wants to destroy the world of
books.”); Schumer, supra note 2, at A15 (“If [the DOJ pursues the case,] “consumers will be
forced to accept whatever prices Amazon sets.”); Nicole Ciandella, Justice Department
Should Drop Apple Lawsuit, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://commcns.org/1qJjZ3i (“[The publishers’ collective decision to contract with Apple]
appears to have been a normal response to Amazon’s deep discounts of e-books below physical book prices. D[O]J’s solution is presumably to stop free enterprise, and allow Amazon
to dominate e-books?”); see also Laura Hazard Owen, E-Book Smackdown: Who Should
Control Pricing—Publishers or Amazon?, PAID CONTENT (Mar. 10, 2012),
http://commcns.org/1kzkCsp.
8
Aaron Smith, Apple: We Didn’t Stifle E-Book Rivals, CNNMoney (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://commcns.org/1e8GAB6.
9
Michael Hiltzik, Government’s E-Book Case Helps Amazon Build Toward a Monopoly, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://commcns.org/1p1cqRM.
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It is important to clarify the controversial aspects of this case and to identify
their nexus with economic and legal principles. It is well accepted that Sherman Act antitrust cases depend upon showing that the defendant’s activities
have frustrated the basic goals of competition10 and have, therefore, harmed the
competitive process. 11 Both Amazon and Apple claimed that their practices
benefited competition.12 Amazon argued that it benefited competition by
providing e-books at affordable prices.13 Apple asserted that its activities provided additional choices to e-book buyers which benefited consumers, given
Amazon’s prior domination of the e-book market.
At first glance, a major weakness for Apple’s policy argument—that its actions were justified by Amazon’s pre-existing monopoly—seems to be that
Amazon, rather than using its market power to charge higher-than-fair prices
for e-books, was charging a predatorily low price of $9.99 per book for bestsellers, taking a loss of several dollars on each book sold.14 In fact, according to
the Justice Department’s complaint, the low prices that Amazon charged for
bestsellers was the very motivation the publishers had for colluding with Apple.15 Amazon’s supporters claimed that no harm was done by Amazon’s market dominance, because its low prices were a benefit to consumers.16 The district court judge appears to have agreed with this view, referring to the Amazon-dominated market prior to Apple’s entrance as reflecting a state of “retail
price competition.”17 An additional charge against Amazon is that its pre-2010
loss-leader pricing strategy resembles predatory pricing, an illegal tool of monopoly maintenance through exclusion.18
10 See Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 1–22 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[A] practice is
‘anticompetitive’ only if it harms the competitive process . . . . It harms that process when it
obstructs the achievement of competition’s basic goals-lower prices, better products, and
more efficient production methods.”).
11 Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters 28 (U.S.
Justice Dep’t, Working Paper, Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://commcns.org/1ibECka.
12 Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, The Apple E-Book Anti-Trust Case: The Closing Arguments,
FORTUNE (June 21, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fO8tPR.
13 Id.
14 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3.
15 Id.
16 Letter from Mark Cooper, Dir. of Research, Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Senator Herb
Kohl, Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, & Consumer Rights
(Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Mark Cooper to Senator Herb Kohl], available at
http://commcns.org/1ghFrny.
17 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
18 K. Craig Wildfang, Predatory Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Do Recent Cases Illuminate the Boundaries?, 31 J. CORP. L. 323, 327 (2005). Monopolists use
predatory prices, that is, prices set below cost, to exclude would-be competitors from entering the market, when they have a reasonable expectation that they can raise the price at a
later time above those that would be offered under a true competitive market, in order to
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Meanwhile, in the case of Apple the harms of their business activities were
easy for the Justice Department to recognize and define in court. The result of
Apple’s “agency pricing” deal with the Publisher Defendants was immediately
felt by retail e-book customers as a hike in the prices of bestselling e-book titles. It is important to keep in mind that an increase in prices to consumers is
not, in theory, the primary harm that modern antitrust law seeks to address.19
As is discussed below, according to prominent voices of the influential “Law
and Economics” school of legal thought,20 decreased output—not impact on
consumer prices—should be the justification for all government prosecution of
antitrust.21 At trial, Apple did not present evidence showing that its actions did
not decrease output in strict economic terms, but instead asserted that its presence in the e-book marketplace created “healthy competition.”22 Thus, Apple
sought to prevail by the application of reasonable justification for its actions in
the context of the marketplace and to prove that its deals with the Publisher
Defendants had a pro-competitive impact on the market for e-books.23
One possible explanation for the DOJ’s decision to charge Apple with antirecoup their losses and receive additional profits. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
697, 703 (1975).
19 Werden, supra note 11, at 1, 39.
20 “Law and Economics” is the legal discipline which advocates that “allocative efficiency” and “social wealth” should be the primary metrics for judging the costs and benefits
of legal rules. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (4th ed. 2009). The “Law and Economics”
discipline was founded by University of Chicago Law School Professor Aaron Director in
the 1950s. See Ronald Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 243–44
(1993). The “Law and Economics” discipline came to early prominence with publications
by Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960). Coase, in particular, is well known for his important, although long-delayed, impact on American broadcast regulations, having made
economic arguments for the allocation of radio spectrum by auction in 1959—a practice
adopted by the Federal Communications Commission in 1994. Thomas W. Hazlett et al.,
Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase, 54 J.L. & ECON. 125, 127 (discussing Ronald Coase’s influence on the FCC). Additionally, the “Law and Economics”
discipline is associated with the Chicago school of economics, a school of economic thought
that grew around several noted economists including Milton Friedman and Frederich Von
Hyak at the University of Chicago after WWII. See Robert Van Horn, Chicago’s Shifting
Attitudes Toward Concentrations of Business Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1527, 1527 n.1
(2011).
21 RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 34 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW]; see also Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 363, 365 (1965) (asserting that interpreters of antitrust law should preserve competition, because “competition provides society with the maximum output that can be achieved
at any given time with the resources at its command”).
22 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 707–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
23 Id.
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trust violations and not Amazon is the difference in treatment of single-party
behavior from multi-party behavior under antitrust law. The case law that has
developed in the one-hundred-year history of the Sherman Act, and especially
in the last four decades, reserves harsh, per se liability for cases of collaborative price fixing by market competitors such as Apple and the Publisher Defendants.24 This harsh treatment of horizontal price fixing contrasts with the
heavier burden to be met when prosecuting individual companies that pursue
and maintain market power on their own, as Amazon is widely accused of doing.25 At trial, Apple faced the overriding presumption that its specific actions
fell under an established per se category of antitrust, precluding consideration
of its fostering-competition argument.26 Apple failed in its defense against the
government’s per se case, and Apple’s arguments to justify its actions in light
of Amazon’s prior market dominance did not persuade the court.27
The Justice Department’s decision to pursue an antitrust case against Apple
has been controversial.28 The Justice Department’s case against Apple has received heavy criticism from industry groups like the Authors Guild, which
proclaimed that “our government may be on the verge of killing real competition in order to save the appearance of competition.”29 New York Senator
Charles Schumer urged the Justice Department to drop the suit, and even accused it of threatening to “wipe out the publishing industry as we know it.”30
Meanwhile, United States v. Apple has been described by a legal expert as, “as
mainstream an antitrust case as you could possibly imagine.”31 The rest of this
Note is intended to explain the difference between such opposing views and to
propose bridging this gap with additional steps in the process of preparing cases that would ensure that antitrust is being pursued in the best interest of the
24 See Cont’l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50–51 (1977); Werden, supra
note 11, at 19, 42–44.
25 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 37–38 (discussing Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey v. United States, 211 U.S. 1 (1911), where the Court distinguished between
anticompetitive behavior by means of “fusion”—also known as merger-to-monopoly—and
contracts in restraint of trade).
26 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
27 Id. at 706–09.
28 Christopher Matthews, Should Justice Drop the Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, TIME.COM
(July 23, 2012), http://commcns.org/NkXHoK. For example, when the Final Judgment for
the Settling Defendants was opened to public comment, the government received comments
that “were both voluminous and overwhelmingly negative,” with more than 90% of the
commenters opposing the Final Judgment. See United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d
623, 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
29 Letter from Scott Turow, President, Authors Guild, to Members (Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Scott Turow to Members], available at http://commcns.org/1qk1d2d.
30 Schumer, supra note 2, at A15.
31 Should Justice Drop the Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, supra note 28.
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public.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHERMAN ACT BY THE
COURTS

To understand the possible legal implications of the anticompetitive practices of Apple and Amazon and the policies of antitrust prosecutors regarding
prosecution, it is helpful to examine the relevant concepts in the Sherman Act
and how they came about. Antitrust law began in America with the passage of
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which makes illegal “every contract . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”32 Section 2 prohibits monopolies or attempts and conspiracies to monopolize.33 The law of antitrust was subsequently expanded by Congress with the Clayton Act of 1914,34 the Robinson–Patman Act of 1936,35 and the Tunney Act of 1974.36 Among other things,
the Clayton Act supplemented the Sherman Act’s general ban on anticompetitive cartels and monopolies with bans on specific activities deemed harmful to
competition.37 Further, the Clayton Act added regulations as to the merger and
acquisition processes. 38 The Tunney Act required judicial review and an opportunity for public comment on settlements between the Justice Department and
civil antitrust defendants.39 This section will only discuss the Sherman Act’s
original two provisions, because they are the bases for the Justice Department’s case against Apple and the Publisher Defendants—raising § 1 issues40—and the allegations against Amazon of monopoly—raising § 2 issues.41
Importantly, the standards by which the company’s actions are to be judged
and, especially, what differentiates them, are not actually in the text of the
Sherman Act.42 Therefore, it is important to begin—before moving on to the
particular standards that courts use—with an explanation for why the Sherman
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Id. § 2.
34 See Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
35 See Robinson–Patman Antidiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526
(1936).
36 See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974).
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–14. Section 13 bans certain forms of price discrimination. Id. § 13.
Section 14 bans agreements to not use the goods of a competitor. Id. § 14.
38 Id. § 18.
39 Id. § 16(b)–(h).
40 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
41 Apple: We Didn’t Stifle E-book Rivals, supra note 8; see 15 U.S.C. § 2.
42 George E. Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will: Developing Standards for
Criminal Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 390, 417 (1979).
The Sherman Act’s legislative history demonstrates that the Sherman Act “was deliberately
intended to be indefinite with specificity to be provided by the judiciary.” Id. at 417.
32
33
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Act’s standards are overwhelmingly the product of judicial interpretation and
not statutory text.
The critical role of jurisprudence in clarifying the boundaries of the Sherman Act was necessitated by the Act’s vague text as well as its ambiguous legislative history.43 When it was passed by Congress in 1890, there was little
agreement about exactly what the two provisions of the Sherman Act would do
or how they would affect anticompetitive activities.44 Some scholars have concluded that the Sherman Act was intended to maximize wealth,45 while others
conclude that it was focused only on the protection of consumers.46 Further left
unanswered was whether enforcement actions and courts should seek to ensure
the provision of lower prices on goods for consumers, even when those lower
prices are predatory.47 It is clear is that the framers of the Sherman Act were
motivated by the public outcry against the “epidemic” problem of the rapid
combination of firms to form monopolies, also known as the trusts.48 These
trusts were massively expanding firms, often exploiting newly developed abilities to buy stock in one another, and using their dominating market position to
either undercut competitors with low prices or gouge consumers with high
prices.49 It was widely understood that cartelization and monopoly were major
problems that needed to be addressed, but it was unclear as to how courts and
prosecutors would go about accomplishing this through the Sherman Act.50
The text of the Sherman Act addresses two main aspects of anticompetitive
activity. Section 1 of the Act prohibits the anticompetitive practices that are
used to build and maintain market power, by proscribing “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce.”51 Section 2 prohibits the end result of such practices, the formation
43 RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW
17 (rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA].
44 Id.
45 See Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON.
7, 7 (1966).
46 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to
Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 967 (1999)
[hereinafter Proving the Obvious]; see also Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 150 (1982) [hereinafter Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust].
47 Areeda & Turner, supra note 18, at 706–09 (discussing the administrative difficulty
in controlling “predatory pricing” practices).
48 PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 23.
49 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 34.
50 PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 17.
51 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179
(1911); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
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of monopolies, by making illegal, activities that “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize” trade.52 The meaning of these provisions was immediately complicated by several factors. First, the Sherman Act’s statutory prohibitions
lacked standards that would have allowed judges to form a “coherent, administrable legal doctrine.”53 Second, the English common law theories on which
the Act’s language is based did not contain a strong or consistent monopoly
policy or definition.54 Third, the Act’s sponsors were inconsistent in their
statements regarding the bill’s purpose beyond the need to protect “fair prices.”55
With such minimal guidance from the law’s text or legislative history, courts
were required to enforce the Sherman Act by constructing their own rules applying reason and economic and civic principles.56 Yet, even after courts began
to establish the boundaries and standards of the Sherman Act, controversy over
the proper framework for identifying “restraint of trade” persisted for years.57
Only in recent decades has a consensus formed that courts are to look not to
civic or political goals, but solely to economic analysis regarding the “competitive process” as reflected by the overall welfare of society.58 Currently, some
scholars and practitioners are calling for a return to direct consideration of consumer choice59 and consumer prices60 amidst a majority view that the “competitive process” and total economic efficiency should be the priority, even when
the result is higher prices or fewer choices for consumers.61
For a statute that is so reliant on clarification by judge-made rules, the history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act was slow to start.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35.
54 William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L.
REV. 355, 355–56, 367, 384 (1954). Judge Bork has posited that the framers of the Sherman
Act referred to the “common law” of antitrust in the bill’s legislative history as a shorthand
for their favored, often cherry-picked legal opinions while they argued that the principles
reflected therein were to be codified by the passage of the Act. Legislative Intent and the
Policy of the Sherman Act, supra note 45, at 36.
55 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 34. The Sherman Act passed with a mix
of legislative intentions: the Act’s authors argued for its passage to ensure economic “liberty” in the form of freedom from market power and to have fair prices for consumers. PERITZ,
COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 17; see also Garvey, supra note 42, at
417 (asserting that the Sherman Act’s vagueness was intended by the Act’s drafters).
56 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35.
57 Garvey, supra note 42, at 417.
58 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35.
59 Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for
Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44, 54 (1998).
60 Proving the Obvious, supra note 46, at 962.
61 Werden, supra note 11, at 2 (“In the 1911 Standard Oil decision, the Supreme Court
first considered in depth the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
52
53
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For the first two decades after the original passage of the 1890 Act, even the
justifiable outer limits of antitrust enforcement by government prosecutors was
left largely unresolved.62 The first major decision by the Supreme Court that
attempted to define the breadth of the Sherman Act was Standard Oil v. United
States, in 1911.63 In Standard Oil, the Court created a “rule of reason” to limit
the prosecution of “contracts in restraint of trade.”64 The Standard Oil Court
clarified that the language of the statute was not to be interpreted as a literal
prohibition against any contract which in any way restrains the trade of any
person (this would of course include practically all contracts).65 The Court explained that the Act would prohibit only those contracts that unduly restrained
trade.66
Under the Standard Oil ruling, courts were instructed in cases of the fusion
of competing firms, “to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided
by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy
embodied in the statute, in every given case whether any particular act or contract was within the contemplation of the statute.”67 Justice Holmes clarified
the rule several years later, stating that “only such contracts and combinations
are within the act as, by reason of intent or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting competition or
unduly obstructing the course of trade.”68 This standard puts general public
welfare at the center of analysis, taking a broad view of an activity’s impact on
the market as a whole, and ignores the fortunes of individual market participants.
While the Standard Oil opinion and its early progeny69 are frequently criticized as lacking specific guidance for courts or business people to follow with
any consistency,70 modern courts have come to apply a more clearly articulated
burden-shifting version of the rule of reason as the default standard by which a
plaintiff’s proof is measured in Sherman Act cases where a per se rule does not
apply.71 Under “rule of reason” analysis, a plaintiff has an initial burden of
proving that the defendant engaged in a restraint that threatens the competitive

Werden, supra note 11, at 36; POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 34.
See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
64 Id. at 66.
65 Id. at 60.
66 Id. at 61.
67 Id. at 64.
68 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913).
69 See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
70 Andrew Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule
of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 (2012).
71 Id.; Werden, supra note 11, at 43.
62
63
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process.72 If the plaintiff’s initial burden is met, the defendant must show that a
legitimate objective is served by the defendant’s activities which restrained
trade.73 Finally, the plaintiff may rebut the defendant’s justification by showing
that either the defendant’s objective can be achieved by a substantially less
restrictive alternative or that the challenged behavior is not reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives claimed by the defendant.74 If applied,
the rule’s openness to hearing out the defendant’s reasons for engaging in its
activity might have offered Apple a pathway to a successful defense.75
At trial, Apple sought to benefit from the rule’s openness by claiming that
its purpose in dealing with the Publisher Defendants was legitimate and that
their activities with the publishers had pro-competitive effects.76 Judge Denise
Cote believed that a rule of reason analysis was inapplicable, because of the
particular nature of Apple and the Publisher Defendants’ alleged antitrust activities.77 Therefore, Apple faced the harsher per se rule against horizontal price
fixing.78
Much of the jurisprudence in the intervening years since the Standard Oil
case centers on the recognition that certain practices are too clearly anticompetitive to require the detailed analysis of the “rule of reason” and are, therefore, illegal per se under the Sherman Act.79 The first of the per se rules, which
identified practices that almost always result in a restraint of trade, had been
issued by the time of the Standard Oil ruling.80 In 1897, in the Trans-Missouri
72 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW]; see
also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule
of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful.”).
73 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502; see also Law v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Under a rule of reason analysis, an
agreement to restrain trade may still survive scrutiny under section 1 if the procompetitive
benefits of the restraint justify the anticompetitive effects.”).
74 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502; see White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Race Tires Am., Inc. v.
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp, 614 F.3d 57, 74–75 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The plaintiff then must
demonstrate that the restraint itself is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective.”).
75 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502; The Apple E-Book Anti-Trust Case:
The Closing Arguments, supra note 12.
76 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
77 Id. at 691, 694. Judge Cote noted, however, that should the rule of reason have applied, then Apple would still have violated the Sherman Act, because Apple failed to show
pro-competitive effects from its agreements with the Publisher Defendants. Id. at 694.
78 Id.
79 Gavil, supra note 70, at 736 n.19.
80 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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Freight Association case, the Supreme Court ruled that collusive pricing is
always inefficient and should be forbidden without regard for “what the intent
was on the part of those who signed it.”81 The list of per se antitrust activities
grew over the next several decades to include market divisions and group boycotts, which, along with collusive pricing, are all multi-party activities.82 Additionally, a list of licensing practices by copyright holders was described by the
Justice Department as “The Nine No-Nos.”83
A major distinction has developed between practices which involve “vertical” combinations as well as vertical restraints such as those between producers and distributors of a product, which are seen as less harmful to competition,
and “horizontal” mergers and deals between competitors, which receive the
highest scrutiny, and are subject to the most durable of the per se rules.84 Of
most import to the case against Apple is the position courts have taken that the
making of horizontal deals to fix prices—for example, “cartelization”—is
“manifestly anticompetitive”85 and lacks “any redeeming virtue.”86 These charId. at 342.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259–60 (1963).
83 Makan Delrahim, Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 343,
344 n.2 (2005).
84 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (“[The Sherman
Act contains a] basic distinction between concerted and independent action.”); Thomas
Leary, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Conference Board 2004 Antitrust Conference: Structured Outline for the Analysis of Horizontal Agreements 1 (Mar. 3–4, 2004),
available at http://commcns.org/1cEXOYp; see also Werden, supra note 11, at 41.
85 Cont’l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977).
86 Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 365
(“Price-fixing is antisocial precisely because it lessens the total output of society. When
competitors agree on higher prices and put them into effect, they necessarily restrict output
and so reduce total wealth.”). Robert Bork was talking about physical commodities that
always incur a substantial marginal cost to produce one more widget, but it is uncertain how
his analysis applies to e-books when the marginal cost of another copy of a bestseller is
negligible for the publisher. Seth Godin, How Much Should an eBook Cost?, DOMINO PROJECT (Dec. 20, 2011), http://commcns.org/1h29gKD. But will a price-fixing agreement
among competitors in digital media ever result in no societal decrease in total output? Assuming that at a higher price, fewer books would likely be sold, the answer depends on
whether that reduction in dissemination of the digital media represents a real reduction in
societal output. It its briefs in the Apple case, the Justice Department has relied more on the
simple effect of higher prices for consumers as evidence of an antitrust harm. Complaint,
supra note 1, at 5 (alleging that “Defendants’ ongoing conspiracy and agreement have
caused e-book consumers to pay tens of millions of dollars more for e-books than they otherwise would have paid”). Yet, a reduced volume in e-book sales as compared to a hypothetical scenario should be the legitimate measure of societal loss under the Borkean model.
As long as the expected result of higher prices on a digital commodity is fewer copies sold,
it seems unlikely that price-fixing agreements for digital commodities should be any differ81
82
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acterizations also differentiate the conduct by both Apple and Amazon. While
Apple was liable for participating in a horizontal price-fixing scheme, Amazon
was criticized for using its vertical integration as a publisher, retailer, and ereader seller to disrupt traditional publishers and devalue their products.87
While the case law has differentiated between certain multi-party and singleparty anticompetitive behaviors, there are arguments to be made for applying
similar treatment to single and multiple-party offenders overall. Judge Richard
Posner, a proponent of the “Law and Economics” discipline, has written that
“[a]n intelligent antitrust policy cannot stop with collusive pricing among independent firms and ignore monopoly pricing by a single firm.”88 He calls for
similar treatment of multi-party and single-party price fixing, or else competing firms would be given “an incentive to merge into a single firm in order to
be able to practice monopoly pricing without inviting punishment.”89 A major
contrast between the activities of Apple and the activities of Amazon is that
Amazon did not enter into agreements with any external entity to conduct its
offending business practices. But if, as Judge Posner says, a single company
which fixes prices is equally guilty of anticompetitive behavior as a group of
companies who work together to fix prices,90 then the legal boundary between
Apple’s price-setting collusion and the “anti-competitive” prices used by Amazon for e-books becomes blurred.
Unlike “anti-competitive” pricing, the price-fixing conspiracies typically require multiple parties and, therefore, generate more evidence of meetings and
other conspiratorial conduct.91 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the
Supreme Court narrowed the requirements for proving that activities had produced negative outcomes, in cases dealing with per se Sherman Act violations.92 In Socony-Vacuum—also known as Madison Oil—the Court produced
the “definitive” statement of the rule against price fixing,93 but this time the
ent from those for physical commodities.
87 Amy Martinez, Amazon.com Trying to Wring Deep Discounts from Publishers, SEATTLE TIMES, http://commcns.org/1e8GTf1 (last updated Apr. 2, 2012, 11:13 AM).
88 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 37.
89 Id.
90 Id. (“An intelligent antitrust policy cannot stop with collusive pricing among independent firms and ignore monopoly pricing by a single firm.”).
91 Id. at 66. Posner notes that “launching a cartel may require elaborative negotiations
among the parties, which must be carried on in a clandestine manner to avoid immediate
detection by the antitrust enforcers” and that the “likelihood of detection” rises with the
number of parties. Id.
92 See generally United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
93 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 36–37. “Madison Oil” comes from the
name of the city where the trial was held: Madison, Wisconsin. Id. at 37 n.10. In the Apple
opinion, Judge Cote relied on Arizona v. Maricopa County to conclude that the prosecution
had successfully shown that Apple committed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. United
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Court left out any requirement for a potential impact on prices.94 The SoconyVacuum Court held that any attempt at per se anticompetitive behavior, such as
a meeting or a contract for price fixing, even with little likelihood of success,
could be illegal.95
The government has responded to this shift by employing strategies in pricefixing cases that had proven successful in prosecuting conspiracies, focusing
their efforts on proving illicit communications (for example, in-person meetings, email, or telephone conversations).96 The government’s complaint against
Apple and the Publisher Defendants consisted largely of a narrative of meetings and communications between the Publisher defendants and Apple that
relies heavily on such details.97 It is plausible that the prosecutors believed that
Socony-Vacuum relieved them of the need to prove that a conspiracy damaged
competition overall (which Apple contested) or that there was a potential for
an increase in prices.
The Socony-Vacuum decision also foreclosed the possibility that Apple
could defend itself by arguing that the deals made with the Publisher Defendants were justified by Amazon’s anti-competitive pricing on e-books.98 AccordStates v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Court, in Maricopa
County, noted that under “the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . .
is illegal per se. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 347, 351 (1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that the “anticompetitive potential inherent in all
price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered”).
94 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
95 Id.
96 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 37. Note that the DOJ will bring criminal
charges against actors involved in price-fixing agreements; however, the type of case
brought depends on the nature of the underlying conduct. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
DIVISION
MANUAL,
at
III-12
(5th
ed.
2012),
available
at
http://commcns.org/1ghFyQ5. Under Matsushita v. Zenith, to overcome summary judgment,
the claimant must present unambiguous evidence that tends to exclude an innocent interpretation. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1986)
(“On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to consider whether there is other evidence that is
sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired to price
predatorily for two decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must ‘ten[d] to exclude the possibility’ that petitioners underpriced respondents to
compete for business rather than to implement an economically senseless conspiracy.”).
Antitrust cases involving collusion are particularly difficult under the high evidentiary
standards. Collusive conduct, without evidence of an agreement, is nearly impossible to
detect, let alone prove. Lawyers refer to the phenomenon of coordination of pricing “without any overt detectable acts of communication” as “conscious parallelism,” but Posner calls
it “tacit collusion.” POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 53.
97 Complaint, supra note 1, at 13–15.
98 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221–22 (“[Congress] has no more allowed genuine or fancied
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ing to the Socony-Vacuum Court, the Sherman Act generally prohibits collusive activity, regardless of the justification.99 Thus, under Socony-Vacuum,
price-fixing cases—like the one against Apple—allow little opportunity to justify such activities on the basis of accusations of pre-existing price fixing by
other market participants.
III.

THE RISE OF THE “LAW AND ECONOMICS” VIEW OF
ANTITRUST AND RECENT TRENDS IN ENFORCEMENT

By the mid-1950s, the basic structure of the “rule of reason” was largely
agreed upon, while the number of per se rules had begun to grow. Yet, scholars
and professionals disagreed over the ultimate goals of antitrust law.100 In the
1950s and 1960s, antitrust law sought generally to protect unrestrained competition, while accounting for the costs of goods and the viability of small businesses.101 However, antitrust law did not have coherent goals to justify enforcement, which Bork considered irrational.102 However, in 1977, a decisive
shift occurred when the Supreme Court, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., overruled the per se rule against non-price vertical restraints.103 The
last four decades have seen the continued move away from many of the previously established per se rules and toward a consensus in the courts that enforcement of antitrust laws should include an economic analysis as to how antitrust activities impact society’s “total welfare” by harming the competitive
process.104 Support for this trend originated with the “Law and Economics”
movement in the 1960s, led by the influential advocacy of Robert Bork and
Richard Posner, among others.105
competitive abuses as a legal justification for [price-fixing] schemes than it has the good
intentions of the members of the combination.”).
99 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221–22.
100 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50
(1978) [hereinafter THE ANTITRUST PARADOX].
101 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 373; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (describing the “preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions” as among the purposes of the Sherman Act).
102 THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 100, at 50.
103 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977); see also Werden,
supra note 11, at 20 (noting the Sylvania decision’s importance).
104 Gavil, supra note 70, at 734 (noting that, since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has “
march[ed] away from per se rules” and has incorporated economic principles into the ruleof-reason analysis).
105 Dylan Matthews, ‘Antitrust Was Defined by Robert Bork. I Cannot Overstate His
Influence’, WASH. POST (Dec. 20. 2012), http://commcns.org/1bkRbDX; see Roger Parloff,
The Negotiator No One Doubts That Richard Posner Is a Brilliant Judge and Antitrust Theoretician. Is That Enough to Bring Microsoft and the Government Together?, CNNMONEY
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While largely successful in their influence on jurisprudence, “Law and Economics” proponents have recognized that their approach differs from the populist impulses with which the American public understood the antitrust laws.106
It is not surprising then, that Senator Schumer and other proponents of the public controversy over the Justice Department’s decision to prosecute Apple
omitted legal rationales from their criticisms.107
The heart of the “Law and Economics” approach to antitrust is a consistent
economic understanding of the harms understood to result from the process of
forming and maintaining monopoly power.108 When a firm gains monopoly
power over a market, it is no longer subject to the standard competitive impulse to produce the greatest possible quantity of the product and offer it for
the lowest possible price.109 Once monopoly power is obtained and competition
is eliminated entirely or diminished seriously, then producing less of a product
while raising the price may be a more profitable strategy for the producer.110 A
producer (or a cartel) that controls the majority of the market share can withhold supply from the market to the extent necessary to increase demand, allowing the monopolist to raise prices.111
Although the monopolist must sell fewer items to achieve the desired higher
prices, his primary benefit is from the increase in the marginal profit returned
on the items produced—the source of monopoly profits.112 So as long as competitors control a small fraction of the market, then each competitor’s ability to
affect prices by reducing supply will be offset by the other competitors’ willingness to increase output.113 Thus, the monopolist profits while prices rise and
(Jan. 10, 2000), http://commcns.org/1hWrZJv.
106 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35 (“After a century and more of judicial
enforcement of the antitrust statutes, there is a consensus that guidance must be sought in
economics” rather than populist notions). Posner describes “populist impulses” as seeking to
protect consumers from high prices and loss of choices, and to shield small businesses from
the advantages of larger corporate competitors and the powers of concentrated wealth. Id. at
34.
107 See, e.g., Schumer, supra note 2, at A15; Letter from Scott Turow to Members, supra
note 29. Some have argued that antitrust enforcement is particularly susceptible to the effects of public perception. See Larry Smith, Continental Airlines Navigates Public Scrutiny
over Antitrust Exemption, LEVICK DAILY (Apr. 15, 2009), http://commcns.org/1d4UiH1.
108 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 9 (arguing that the monopolist’s
“‘power over price’”—for example, the ability to use market power to set high prices and
drive down production—is “the essence of the economic concept of monopoly.”).
109 Id. at 10.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 10–11.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 10. Ultimately the high prices for the monopolized item motivate additional
suppliers to enter the market and compete by offering prices slightly lower than the monopolist’s price. Id. This leads to the common refrain from proponents of lax antitrust en-
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while consumer choice, total employment, small business growth, and innovation decrease.114
This is where the so-called “layperson’s” narrative of the danger of anticompetitive activity often ends.115 Yet, Judge Posner discounts some of the
popularly feared effects of monopolies, arguing, for example, that the price
effects of a monopoly on consumers should be ignored as merely transfer
payments, which were costless to society.116 Furthermore, “Law and Economics” advocates consider protectionist motivations for antitrust enforcement
economically unsound.117 Judge Posner believes that the “economic theory of
monopoly provides the only sound basis for antitrust policy.”118 The “economic
theory of monopoly”—according to Posner and other “Law and Economics”
advocates—opposes monopolies as decreasing society’s total wealth and as
decreasing customer satisfaction.119 Under this view, the true evil of monopoly
primarily accrues through a “loss in value resulting from the substitution [by
customers] for the monopolized product” causing a “net loss” to the economy.120 While increased prices to consumers may be the most noticeable and
politically resonant effect of monopolies, they are seen as less detrimental than
the cost that monopolies impose on society as a whole.121 In short, increased
prices reward the monopolist’s reduced production of demanded goods, while
forcement that “all monopolies are temporary.” But the problem is the damage to public
welfare that occurs while they exist and the waste caused by single entities or groups seeking to gain monopoly power by inefficient means. Id. at 13–14.
114 Id. at 12.
115 Id. at 13.
116 Id. (“Those higher prices are the focus of the layperson’s concern about monopoly-an
example of the often sharp divergence between lay economic intuition and economic analysis.”). The monopolist unfairly takes property from the consumer without providing any
compensating “transfer payments.” Judge Posner advocates ignoring this wealth transfer
from the consumer to the monopolist when calculating the harm of a monopoly because in
the scheme of the economy as a whole it sums to zero, albeit recognizing the collateral possibility of some net loss to society’s total welfare due to indirect effects of monopoly pricing
as an incentive toward inefficient monopoly-seeking behavior by producers and distributors.
This is distinct from other effects of monopoly such as inefficiency and decreases in overall
economic output. See id. For a view opposing the Chicago School’s, see Robert Lande’s
article, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust, supra note 46,
at 76.
117 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 364 (“It is the rapid acceleration of the . . .
‘protectionist’ trends in antitrust that has brought on the present crisis.”).
118 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 9.
119 See also Robert Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2349, 2351 n.4 (2013).
120 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 13.
121 George J. Stigler, Monopoly, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://commcns.org/1fgmmBz
(last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
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forcing consumers to satisfy their demands at a higher cost by resorting to substitutes.122 Posner and “Law and Economics” proponents believe that the main
concern should be preventing inefficiency caused by artificial scarcity.123
This contention is critical to understanding why the practices of Amazon
and the prosecution of Apple raise such fundamental concerns in antitrust
law.124 Under the economic theory of modern antitrust law, the higher prices
that consumers paid for e-book bestsellers, after Apple entered the market, is
only relevant as circumstantial evidence that fewer e-books were distributed
than otherwise would have been.125 If this theory were followed without regard
to the per se rule against price fixing, then the only economically sound basis
for prosecuting Apple and the Publisher Defendants would be their collusion’s
effect of lowering the overall output of e-books.126
Judge Posner’s view of “efficiency” as the sole legitimate goal of competition policy has been criticized for inconsistently describing the measure of efficiency.127 According to “Law and Economics” proponents, the Sherman Act
should only be enforced on the basis of cognizable harm to competition that
results in reduced output.128 If this is true, can Apple’s transgressions be justified under the Sherman Act by the necessities of competing against an existing
monopoly? The previous section discussed the adoption of per se rules, including the rule against horizontal price fixing, which, under the ruling of SoconyVacuum, foreclosed any further economic analysis or the “rule of reason.”129
But in subsequent cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the courts have softened some
of the per se doctrines to be presumptions which can be rebutted by a showing
of circumstances that the defendant was not engaging in restraining trade.130
122 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 12–13. As an example, a monopoly cost
of a pork chop that is sold at a monopoly price is of little or no concern to Posner but true
harm of monopolies is the aggregate effect on the economy. This causes consumers to unnecessarily eat Spam when they really want pork chops and could afford pork chops if they
were sold at a lower, more competitive market-price.
123 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 2.
124 Should Justice Drop the Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, supra note 28.
125 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 12.
126 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 365 (“Price-fixing is antisocial precisely
because it lessens the total output of society. When competitors agree on higher prices and
put them into effect, they necessarily restrict output and so reduce total wealth.”).
127 Rudolph J. Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the
Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1289 (1984).
128 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 365.
129 See supra Part II.
130 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
100–01 (1984) (holding that “we have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per
se rule to this case,” because the NCAA is “an industry in which horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (applying the “rule of reason” to analyze the
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Apple’s best hope at overcoming the government’s case at trial was to show
evidence that the per se rule against price fixing should not apply, that its deals
with the Publisher Defendants was necessary for its legitimate business objectives, and that its activities had procompetitive effects.131 Apple was unsuccessful at each of these goals.132
IV.

THE CASE AGAINST APPLE AND THE PUBLISHER
DEFENDANTS

Now that the Sherman Act’s history and current jurisprudential standards
have been discussed, we can address the central purpose of this article, to assess the decision of the Justice Department to prosecute Apple for violating the
Sherman Act. Apple’s entry into the market for digital books was strikingly
different from Amazon in approach and market effects.133 However, the tactics
employed by both companies in the few short years since they began selling ebooks have been unconventional and ruthless.134 With the e-book market, Apple and Amazon have both been in competition.135 In 2009, Amazon was maintaining a 90% market share in e-books, selling bestsellers at $9.99 per title.136
Amazon’s retail price on many bestsellers was several dollars less than the
wholesale price for which the Publisher Defendants sold the books to Amaallegedly anti-competitive activity, because the “blanket license has provided an acceptable
mechanism for at least a large part of the market”).
131 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 691, 694–95, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
see AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502. As Professor Areeda explained:
To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must allege that competition in a specified market has
been restrained. To avoid adverse summary judgment it must show that the facts favor
or at least that there are disputed material facts on that question. If such a restraint is
shown, the burden passes to the defendant to offer evidence that a legitimate objective
is served by the alleged behavior. That justification will be lost if the plaintiff shows
that the objective can be achieved by a substantially less restrictive alternative . . . [For
a legitimate and necessary objective], the harms and benefits must be compared to
reach a net judgment whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable.
Id.
132 Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 691, 694–95, 700.
133 Schumer, supra note 2, at A15.
134 See Ken Auletta, Publish or Perish: Can the iPad Topple the Kindle, and Save the
Book Business?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 26, 2010), http://commcns.org/1cL4C14 (“Jobs
planned to stand on Amazon’s neck and press down hard, with publishers applauding.”);
Complaint, supra note 1, at 3 (“Apple had long believed it would be able to ‘trounce Amazon by opening up [its] own ebook store.’”); Martinez, supra note 87; Richard Eskow, Protesters Confront Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos, THENATION.COM (May 29, 2012),
http://commcns.org/1eemOR4.
135 Mark Rogowsky, E-Book Case Reminds Apple Its Biggest Enemy Isn’t Samsung or
Google, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013), http://commcns.org/PdVE7y.
136 Hiltzik, supra note 9.
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zon.137 The Publisher Defendants feared that Amazon’s $9.99 price, which was
substantially lower than the price for hardcover versions, would become the
new standard, thereby driving down prices for hardcovers and for best-selling
and newly released e-books, in general.138 In early 2010, Apple made an
agreement with each of the five largest book publishers to sell e-books in Apple’s online iTunes store under an “agency” pricing model, which allowed the
publishers to raise the prices at which e-books would be sold and would guarantee Apple a 30% margin.139 It is these deals between Apple and the book
publishers, which are the central activities for which the Justice Department
prosecuted Apple for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.140 In assessing the
case against Apple, this section first looks at the deals and how they came
about in detail, and then considers the defenses Apple attempted to employ.
Apple and its original co-defendants, the Publisher Defendants, each entered
into their agency-pricing deals with clear motivations.141 Apple had an interest
in becoming a retailer of e-books in order to expand the utility of its digital
content marketplace, the iTunes store.142 Only two years before, Apple CEO
Steve Jobs had expressed doubt about the profitability of ebooks, saying, “It
doesn’t matter how good or bad the product is, the fact is that people don’t
read anymore.”143 By the time that Apple was planning for the debut of the
iPad, it was clear that by adding e-books to the media catalogue of iTunes, Apple would be raising revenue while destroying its rival’s market dominance in
e-books.144
Meanwhile, the publishers were interested in the higher price at which Apple was selling books to consumers.145 However, the Justice Department’s
complaint characterizes Amazon’s low prices as a beneficial and natural result
of healthy “price competition.”146 The complaint states that the Publisher Defendants intended to end this competition and cause e-book prices to rise above
the $9.99 that Amazon was offering.147 It is clear from the Publisher Defendants’ statements quoted by the complaint that the publishers were so interested
in pushing e-book prices up that they were willing to give Apple a 30% com-

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Complaint, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 10.
Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 5.
Auletta, supra note 134.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
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mission on each e-book that Apple sold.148 Under the agency pricing model,
publishers controlled the sale price, and the retailer became the publishers’
“agent,” having no power to “alter the retail prices set by the publishers.”149
Apple’s 30% commission was bigger than the commission Amazon received
from wholesale pricing, even for those books that were not sold for a loss.150
Publishers charged Amazon and other wholesale retailers around $13 for a
bestseller.151 However, the publishers’ share of e-book sales with Apple usually
resulted in approximately a $9 share.152 Still, publishers believed that the decreased revenue was worth it to keep retail prices high for both e-books and
printed books.153
Industry analysts list several reasons book publishers desired rising e-book
prices despite a loss of direct revenue from each e-book sold. Most directly, the
publishers believed that the price Amazon sought for best-selling titles created
an incorrect public perception that $9.99 represented a fair price for a bestselling e-book copy and, by inference, devalued the best-selling print versions
of books.154 Therefore, the publishers believed that pushing the price of e-books
upwards would result in increased profits from print books, which was feasible
in a world without $9.99 e-book bestsellers.155
The publishers may also have been motivated to collude with Apple so as to
gain bargaining leverage over Amazon.156 As discussed below, after announcing their deals with Apple, the publishers approached Amazon with a credible
threat to pull their books from Amazon’s catalog—an offer Amazon could not
refuse.157
Traditionally, publishers had sole control of the distribution channel between authors and consumers.158 Another major motivation to make agencypricing deals with Apple was that they were existentially threatened by the
prospect of Amazon using its domination of e-book sales to sign-up its own
authors.159 Amazon had already begun to offer authors the opportunity to sell e-

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
150 Id. at 3.
151 Auletta, supra note 134.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–4.
156 Martinez, supra note 87.
157 Auletta, supra note 134.
158 Id.
159 See David Carr, Book Publishing’s Real Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2012, at B1
(“As low-margin companies trapped in a declining business with fewer outlets, book publishers face an existential threat.”); see also Owen, supra note 7.
148
149
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books directly to Amazon customers in the “Kindle” digital format, circumventing the need for publishers.160 Facing the prospect of obsolescence, brought
on by growing number of self-publishing options, traditional publishers were
placed in an unfamiliar position of defending their very roles in the industry.161
Defenders of the role of the publishers claimed that publishers add value
through their discovery of great books and authors and their editing services,
neither of which Amazon provides.162
If Amazon could convince customers that books were worth less than the
publishers believed, while also expanding the ability of authors to self-publish,
then the publishers could be squeezed out of the publishing equation.163 The
publishers feared a literary world where they no longer existed; a world where
all books were offered directly by the author and were not vetted by “real” editors.164 Amazon’s e-book discounts posed an existential threat to the publishers,
and the publishers wanted the practice curtailed. At the same time, Apple was
preparing to launch the iPad, and Apple intended to sell e-books. The two, Apple and the publishers, came together to limit the retail-price competition
amongst e-books.165 However, the government needed to prove exactly how
Apple and the publishers worked together to set prices or stifle competition.166
According to the DOJ’s complaint, the “price fixing” agreement started with
the publishers not long after Amazon had come to dominate the e-book market.167 In 2008 and 2009, the CEOs of each of the Publisher Defendants met
about every three months at restaurants in Manhattan and discussed the increasing market for e-books and Amazon’s role in that market.168 They discussed what one called the “$9.99 problem” posed by Amazon.169
At these restaurant meetings, the company executives discussed how “Amazon had been buying many e-books from publishers for about [$13.00] and
selling them for $9.99, taking a loss on each book in order to gain market share
and encourage sales of its electronic reading device, the Kindle.”170 According

160 Carol Memmott, Authors Catch Fire with Self-Published E-Books, USA TODAY (Feb.
9, 2011), http://commcns.org/1e8H1vd.
161 See id. (listing self-publishing firms); see also Auletta, supra note 134 (describing a
possible future without traditional publishers).
162 Owen, supra note 7.
163 Id. (arguing that the market may be better served without traditional publishers).
164 See Kristine Kathryn Rusch, The Business Rusch: Slush Pile Truths, KRISWRITES.COM
(July 6, 2011), http://commcns.org/PGnVUG (internal quotation marks omitted).
165 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
166 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223, 225–26 n.59 (1940).
167 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3.
168 Id. at 13–14.
169 Id. at 14–15.
170 See Auletta, supra note 134.
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to the prosecution in the Apple case, by the end of 2009, a conspiracy emerged
between the Publisher Defendants, called joint ventures, which had the purpose
of stopping retail-price competition and raising e-book prices above $9.99.171
This strategy, the switch to selling e-books by an “agency model” where retail
prices would be dictated by the publishers, was considered impossible without
the participation of publishers representing a major portion of Amazon’s market share.172 Also critical was the inclusion of a “most favored nation” clause in
each of Apple’s contracts with the publishers, guaranteeing Apple the ability to
match the lowest price of each title offered by any competitor.173 This price
parity provision imposed severe penalties on any publisher who would choose
to stay with the old wholesale model, guaranteeing to each of the publishers
that they would act as a group. 174
The Publisher Defendants carried out their plan, so as to avoid antitrust liability. Ken Auletta, a media business writer for the New Yorker, reported some
of the most important details of the case in an article in spring 2010.175 After
speaking extensively with the publishers, he observed that “none of the publishers seemed to think that they could act alone, and if they presented a unified demand to Amazon they risked being charged with price-fixing and collusion.”176 That report indicates that the publishers approached the plan with requisite caution about the very prosecution that they ultimately faced, and carefully chose a method they believed would allow them to address the “$9.99”
problem without violating the antitrust laws.177
On January 27, 2010, Apple announced its plan to enter the e-book market.178 Prior to that announcement, however, each publisher had contracted with
Apple.179 Then, bound by the most-favored-nation clause in their contracts with
Apple, the publishers collectively forced the agency-pricing switch on their ebook sellers in a matter of weeks and months, beginning with Amazon.180 Former Apple CEO Steve Jobs announced that Apple had made deals with the
publishers to sell their books in the iTunes store in his speech at the media
event premiering the iPad on January 27, 2010.181 Jobs, after his presentation,
Complaint, supra note 1, at 15.
Id. at 2–3.
173 Id. at 20–21.
174 Id. at 21.
175 See generally Auletta, supra note 134.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
180 Id. at 26–28.
181 Steve Jobs, Address at the Yerba Buena Center for the Arts Announcing the “iBooks
App” (Jan. 27, 2010), http://commcns.org/NLjh6E.
171
172
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was interviewed by Walt Mossberg at the Wall Street Journal.182 When Mossberg asked why consumers would pay Apple $14.99 when they can buy the
same book from Amazon for $9.99, Jobs responded, “That won’t be the case.
The price will be the same.”183 Continuing, Jobs said, “Publishers may withhold their books from Amazon,” because “[t]hey’re unhappy.”184
These quotes seemed damning enough to the Justice Department that they
were laid-out in the complaint against Apple and the publishers, and were presented throughout the Apple trial.185 What Jobs knew regarding the motivations
of the publishers and when he knew it were central issues in the prosecution’s
case.186 If he were still alive at the time, Jobs may have been called to testify in
the trial.187 Instead, the DOJ quoted Walter Issacson’s biography of Steve Jobs
and emails he wrote at the time of the e-book deals, which suggest that he
knew that Apple was providing the publishers with a conduit through which to
coordinate their desired change in pricing models.188
It is essential to the prosecution of an antitrust collusion case to prove the
actual “acts of conspiring” which formed an anti-competitive conspiracy between the defendants. 189 The deals Apple made with each of the publisher defendants were “vertical” in orientation, that is, between entities placed consecutively in the chain of commerce.190 As discussed previously, vertical price
fixing strategies are not per se illegal under the Sherman Act in the way that
horizontal schemes are.191 Therefore, to foreclose Apple’s ability to argue toward positive impacts of its deal in a “rule of reason” analysis, it was necessary
to the Justice Department’s case to show that a “horizontal” agreement was
Auletta, supra note 134.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
184 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
185 Complaint, supra note 1, at 25–26; see also United States Closing Argument Presentation at 60, United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12 CV
2826)
[hereinafter
U.S.
Closing
Argument
Presentation],
available
at
http://commcns.org/1dDhgTr.
186 U.S. Closing Argument Presentation, supra note 185, at 64.
187 Nate Raymond, Apple CEO Cook Ordered to Testify in E-Books Case, REUTERS
(Mar. 13, 2013), http://commcns.org/1ilJ9PK.
188 United States’ Opening Statement Presentation at 2, 57, 73, 78, United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12 CV 2826) [hereinafter U.S. Opening
Statement Presentation], available at http://commcns.org/MXh6ff.
189 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (“Under the
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is illegal per se.”).
190 Andrew Orlowski, Apple Returns to Courtroom Once Again to Contest Ebook Shafting, REGISTER (Aug, 9, 2013), http://commcns.org/1kEN5Qb; see U.S. Opening Statement
Presentation, supra note 188 (demonstrating the chain of commerce through a slide titled
“Publishers Earn Less Under an Agency Model”).
191 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1977).
182
183
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made between market competitors attempting to stifle competition and that
Apple was a knowing participant in a conspiracy to make such a deal.192 To
make its case, the Justice Department introduced numerous records of emails
and calls between the executives of the publishers and Apple, and presented a
graphical representation of the publishers’ communications with Apple that
depicted Apple at the hub of the communications, surrounded by the Publisher
Defendants.193 The government claimed that Apple willingly served as a “critical conspiracy participant” with the Publisher Defendants.194 Apple hoped to
show on a factual basis that it did not conspire with the Publishers and did not
know that they were attempting to raise e-book prices when it made the deals.
Apple argued that it made the agency pricing deals with each of the publishers,
and all in close succession, in order to provide “the best possible e-reading experience for consumers” on its iPad and to announce the arrangements at the
event introducing the iPad.195
Even if Apple were to avoid facing a per se Sherman Act case by showing
that it was not part of the horizontal price fixing conspiracy to which the Publisher Defendants settled before trial,196 the case could still have been litigated
successfully by the DOJ on the broader argument that Apple unreasonably restrained trade by making deals that raised e-book prices.197 In other words, cases of vertical price-fixing are not considered per se anti-competitive, but must
be considered under the “rule of reason” analysis discussed in Part II.198 Unlike
with a per se case, the evidence must address the actual harm that would have
been caused to competition as a result of Apple’s collusion with each of the
publishers.199 Most obvious is the harm of the increased prices of e-books to
consumers under Apple’s agency pricing deals with publishers.200 Apple’s ebook prices were soon adopted by e-book retailers and within weeks the price
of e-books, including those sold by Amazon, increased by several dollars.201
According to one estimate, this price increase cost consumers $200 million in
2012.202 Although Apple faced a per se case, Apple argued, at trial, that its actions did not harm the competition. Apple presented a chart that showed while
The Apple E-book Antitrust Case: The Closing Arguments, supra note 12.
See generally U.S. Opening Statement Presentation, supra note 188.
194 Complaint, supra note 1, at 19.
195 Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
196 See id. at 645.
197 Id. at 694.
198 See discussion supra Part II. See the Standard Oil case for a discussion of antitrust
standards. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1911).
199 Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 688, 694.
200 Id. at 694.
201 Id.
202 Letter from Mark Cooper to Senator Herb Kohl, supra note 16.
192
193
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prices for e-books sold by the Publisher Defendants did increase, the overall
average price of all e-books sold, including by other publishers, actually decreased subsequent to Apple’s entry and the switch to agency pricing.203
From the perspective of consumers, the increased cost of goods available to
them is the clearest harm of anti-competitive behavior.204 But, as discussed previously, for advocates of the Chicago School of Law and Economics, increased
consumer costs are not the correct measure of harm for Sherman Act violations.205 Judge Richard Posner explains that the layperson’s concern that customers of a monopolized good pay a higher price is not the most important
adverse effect of a monopoly.206 Posner would argue that the loss to consumers
who paid the higher monopoly price was “a transfer payment and therefore a
mere bookkeeping entry on the social books.”207 More important, according to
Posner and other “Law and Economics” advocates, is the economist’s concern
for a loss of value to the whole economy from the inefficiency caused by consumers’ substitution of inefficient alternatives in place of their preferred, but
monopolized item.208 According to this view, monopoly’s net costs to society
are in inefficient substitution, inefficient expense by sellers to gain a monopoly, and inefficient expenses by consumers to avoid paying monopoly prices.209
These net costs are difficult to calculate. It also makes it essential to consider
the behavior of consumers within the market.210 Nevertheless, when these net
costs are found to exist, then there are actionable antitrust violations.211 Judge
Posner says that the profits from monopoly pricing are often wasted on protecting and concealing the monopoly.212 Therefore, if Apple and the publishers had
used their increased revenue to build and maintain a dominating market share

203 Exhibit DX-434 (“Average eBook Retail Prices for Sony, Amazon, Barnes & Noble,
Apple Google, Books-A-Million, and Kobo, February 2008–March 2012”), United States v.
Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12 CV 2826) [hereinafter Exhibit
DX-434], available at http://commcns.org/1inZ4kR.
204 Letter from Mark Cooper to Senator Herb Kohl, supra note 16.
205 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35; William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual
DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard
Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007).
206 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 13.
207 Id.; see also William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1238
(1989).
208 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 12 n.5; Kovacic, supra note 205, at 22.
209 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 13–14; see also Page, supra note 207, at
1233.
210 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 13–14.
211 Id. at 17; Wesley J. Liebeler, What Are the Alternatives to Chicago?, 1987 DUKE L.J.
879, 880 (1987).
212 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 15.

2014]

Apple and Amazon’s Antitrust Antics

185

or to stifle competition, then those expenses are lost to society and, therefore,
should be counted as the harm of the antitrust violations as well.213 Under this
approach, Apple and the publishers would not be guilty of antitrust violations
if the consumers who would have purchased e-books from Apple at the lower
price of $9.99 were driven by higher prices to fill their demand with a less desirable and, therefore, less-efficient alternative (e.g., older, cheap e-book titles,
or printed books).
If antitrust liability should be solely based on the harm from a monopoly to
society, then one market’s failure could counteract the harmful effects of another market’s failure (e.g. a monopoly), thereby justifying anticompetitive
behavior.214 One novel theory, known as the intramarket second-best trade-offs
defense, says just that.215 Under second-best trade-offs, antitrust defendants
have argued that prosecuting them is not in the public interest, because allowing their collusion and reduced production is the second-best alternative to
eliminating all market failures, which for one reason or another is not possible.216
Apple may argue that Amazon’s dominance and maintenance of that dominance, through offering $9.99 bestsellers, represents a market failure causing
irreversible harm to society, and that Apple’s collusion was the second-best
alternative to the government stopping the market failure directly.217 While this
argument theoretically offers hope to a defendant not facing a per se case, it
has not succeeded in the courts.218 Judge Posner, while acknowledging that the
logic of second-best trade-offs follows from some Chicago School theories,
calls its requirements for voluminous economic proof “unworkable” in a practical sense.219 Posner declares, “Finally and decisively, antitrust litigation, already fearfully protracted, costly, and complex, would be completely unworkable if a second-best defense were recognized.”220 Chicago School-style economic calculations for society’s cost of monopolies are less popular than noneconomic values, such as “fairness,” and the Justice Department has cited the
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 12 n.5.
215 Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and
the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 850 (2000).
216 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 13 n.5; Hammer, supra note 215, at 882–
91; Claus Thustrup Hansen, Second-Best Antitrust in General Equilibrium: A Special Case,
63 ECON. LETTERS 193, 196–97 (1999).
217 See Richard B. McKenzie, In Defense of Apple, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (July 2,
2012), http://commcns.org/1cEYs8q (criticizing the DOJ’s rationale for bringing an antitrust-enforcement action against Apple).
218 Hammer, supra note 215, at 883.
219 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 13 n.5.
220 Id.
213
214
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increased cost to consumers as the primary harm caused by Apple in this
case.221
At trial, Apple also argued against prosecution, because there was a net benefit to consumers as a result of its agency pricing deals with the publishers.222
The defense claimed that Apple’s entry into e-book sales provided an alternate
distribution channel for e-books, increasing competition between the retailers
to offer authors and publishers better services and prices.223 As a result, Apple’s
e-book market participation boded well for a future with a more robust e-book
seller marketplace.224 Additionally, with Amazon’s market share reduced below
its prior level of near monopoly, the retail giant was suddenly forced to compete with Apple and others. The defense argued that Amazon would be compelled to innovate and to offer better services to its customers and its growing
(as well as its growing horde of self-published e-book authors). Although these
ends did not ultimately justify Apple’s means under the law, perhaps they
should have.
V.

THE CASE AGAINST AMAZON

The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has successfully pursued a
case against Apple and the five Publisher Defendants for colluding to raise the
price of e-books, in restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.225
But the government’s decision to prosecute the case has been criticized for
221 See, e.g., Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and Why
It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 269 (1994); Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
222 “To support its assertion that Apple’s arrangement was a bad one for consumers, the
government showed a slide indicating that the average price for e-books sold by the five
publishers spiked after they signed the deal.” Tangel, supra note 7, at B2. “Apple’s attorney
denied the government’s accusations and said that the company had brought innovation to a
broken e-book market that has benefited consumers.” Id.
223 Shara Tibken, Apple and the DOJ Face Off over E-Book Prices (FAQ), CNET NEWS
(June 3, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://commcns.org/1lGMAT9 (discussing Apple’s argument that
its e-book participation “fostered innovation and competition by breaking Amazon’s monopolistic grip on the publishing industry and by allowing publishers to set their own prices”).
224 Shara Tibken, Apple’s Eddy Cue: Yep, We Caused E-book Pricing to Rise, CNET
NEWS (June 13, 2013 10:33 AM), http://commcns.org/1e8Haid (observing that Apple’s defense counsel sought to show that Apple “was looking out for customers . . . not trying to
change the e-book market. And . . . while some prices would be higher, consumers ultimately would benefit from the bigger selection of titles”).
225 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The Plaintiffs have shown through compelling evidence that Apple violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act by conspiring with the Publisher Defendants to eliminate retail price competition and to
raise e-book prices.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“[E]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is . . . illegal.”).
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failing to recognize a major contextual factor that critics say negates the economic justification for the case.226 Those critics point out that Amazon built and
maintained a near total monopoly in the e-book market with negative results
for consumers and the economy.227 According to this theory of justification,
Amazon had leveraged market dominance to do irreversible damage to the
publishing industry for several years before Apple even began selling ebooks.228 Amazon’s domination of e-book retail sales, the company’s impact on
the print book industry, and the ways in which Amazon’s practices have “damaged” the publishing industry are frequently raised by critics of the case
against Apple as a means of defending Apple’s practices.229 Therefore, in order
to evaluate the case against Apple, it is helpful to examine Amazon’s activities
in the relevant market, looking for anticompetitive practices or any other contributions to market failures that may undermine, at least on some level, the
legitimacy of the case against Apple.
Amazon’s involvement in the sale of e-books began in 2007 with an aggressive entry into the market for digital books that combined the simultaneous
introduction of the Kindle Reader mobile device and the company’s first offer226 See United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting
that the critics of the proposed final judgment argued that “defendants’ collusive behavior
had substantial pro-competitive effects”); Philip Elmer-DeWitt, The Apple E-book Case Is
Headed for the 2nd Circuit, CNNMONEY (July 10, 2013 1:30 PM),
http://commcns.org/1dbKc1x.
227 See Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (observing that the critics of the proposed final
judgment claimed that Apple and the Publisher Defendants’ “collusive behavior . . . limit[ed] the negative impact of Amazon’s” monopolistic behavior); Roger Parloff, U.S. v Apple: A Puzzle with a Big Piece Missing, CNNMONEY (June 25, 2013, 2:51 PM) [hereinafter
A Puzzle with a Big Piece Missing], http://commcns.org/1lGMFpV (commenting that the
“crux of what makes the case so peculiar” is that Amazon was the dominant player in the
market, not Apple, and Amazon had designed its prices “to exclude new entrants, drive out
competitors, and consolidate [its] monopoly power”).
228 Schumer, supra note 2, at A15 (commenting that early-on, in the e-book business,
Amazon had captured a 90% market share and forced publishers and authors “to [choose
between] allow[ing] their books to be sold at the prices Amazon set . . . or stay[ing] out of
the e-books market entirely”); Owen, supra note 7 (noting that before Apple entered the
market, “Amazon [had] steadily push[ed] down the prices of e-books, [and the] big book
publishers were sinking fast”); Brad Stone, Amazon’s Hit Man, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://commcns.org/1fUStqm (“Physical book sales have been flat for a
decade and are starting to get eclipsed by e-books.”).
229 Schumer, supra note 2, at A15 (claiming that Amazon’s monopoly “served Amazon
well, but it put publishers and authors at a distinct disadvantage as they continued to try to
market paper books and pave a way forward for a digital future”); Shara Tibken, Apple: We
Wanted a ‘Level Playing Field’ for Publishers, CNET NEWS (June 4, 2013 11:11 AM),
http://commcns.org/1cNOOjt (quoting testimony from the CEO of a settling Publisher Defendant—Penguin Group—as saying, “‘There’s a fairly delicate ecosystem in publishing,’”
and although the industry is “‘more and more efficient as the years go by . . . print is definitely going down’”).
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ing of e-books to read on the Kindle.230 Amazon’s prior position as the leading
online seller of traditional printed books, combined with offering the innovative and popular Kindle Reader, were important factors in fostering Amazon’s
success in this new enterprise.231 E-books and mobile reading devices have
been around for years, but Amazon’s sales far outpaced any prior entrant into
the market.232 Critics of Amazon have pointed out that some additional noteworthy practices helped propel Amazon to near total control of the market for
e-books.233 By 2010, Amazon was responsible for an estimated 90% of all ebooks sold.234 This dominance was sustained in part by Amazon’s choice to
offer bestselling e-book titles for the price of $9.99, even while it was usually
paying the publishers several dollars more for each book it sold.235 This tactic,
known as “loss leading,” is widely recognized as a means of attracting customers and expanding market share.236 Typically, a “loss leading” seller accepts a
loss on a sold item or a class of items, at one time, with the expectation that the
uniquely low price will drive buyers to purchase other items, which can be
priced higher than competitive market value, in order to make up for the loss
the seller takes on the “leader” item.237
In Amazon’s case, the tactic may instead have been a “predatory pricing”
scheme, intended to prolong Amazon’s leading position in the market while

230 A Puzzle with a Big Piece Missing, supra note 227; Martinez, supra note 87 (observing that when Amazon introduced the Kindle in 2007, it simultaneously revealed that it
“would sell newly released e-books for $9.99, below the wholesale price”).
231 Martinez, supra note 87 (noting that Amazon accounted for “at least 75 percent of
[online] print-book sales” and “20 to 25 percent of all U.S. book sales”); Ivan Mironchuk,
E-books - How Far Have We Come, DATABASE PUB. CONSULTANTS (July 11, 2011),
http://commcns.org/PdWjG9.
232 See Marie Lebert, eBooks: 1998 – The First eBook Readers, PROJECT GUTENBERG
NEWS (July 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/MXhg6n (stating that the first e-book readers as
we know them today, were introduced in 1998); Alex Hern, Amazon Launches Yet Another
Loss-Leader, but What Is Its Plan?, NEW STATESMAN BLOG (Oct. 12, 2012, 2:42 PM),
http://commcns.org/1n6HgNr (noting that the Kindle is a market dominator for e-book readers).
233 Martinez, supra note 87.
234 Hiltzik, supra note 9.
235 Id.; see also Martinez, supra note 87 (discussing the effects of Amazon’s selling at a
loss).
236 BARRON’S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 338 (5th ed. 1998)
(“Loss leader concept, primarily in retailing, where an item is priced at a loss and widely
advertised in order to draw trade into the store. The loss is considered a cost of promotion
and is offset by the profits on other items sold.”).
237 For example, some critics accuse Amazon of being a “loss leader” in the book business, because with the millions of other products that it sells, “Amazon can practically give
books away to get customers, and then it can make money on them by selling them potato
chips and computers.” Martinez, supra note 87.
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relying on the prospect of a future opportunity to raise prices.238 The prices for
most e-books Amazon sells cost no more than $9.99; further, Amazon claims
that it sells its Kindle Reader device at cost.239 Critics contend that Amazon’s
financial profile signals that a future price increase may be inevitable.240 Analysts have noted that Amazon’s current price-to-earnings ratio—that is, the
share-price compared to the earnings-per-share—reveals that investors expect
Amazon’s profits to increase drastically.241 However, it is unclear how Amazon’s profits can increase without increasing the prices on the items it sells,
including e-books.242 Critics also point out that e-books purchased for the Kindle can only be read on a Kindle device or application and customers’ purchased electronic libraries are therefore “locked” to their Kindles forever.243
Therefore, the longer that Amazon could prolong its market dominance, then
the more difficult it would be for its customer base to give up their Kindles and
migrate to a competing e-reader platform, if Amazon raised prices for e-book
bestsellers up to or above the wholesale price.
The use of sub-market prices to keep competitors out of the market is not
new.244 The drafters of the Sherman Act discussed hypothetical scenarios in
which a monopolist discourages competitors by charging low prices that no
one else can meet.245 But at that time and for many decades thereafter, much of
activity that came to be referred to as “predatory pricing” involved charging
prices that were too low for competitors to match, though still above the costs
of the alleged violator.246 The modern use of the concept has been brought into
focus, starting in the 1970s, by a highly influential paper that defined prices as
predatory only when they are below the marginal costs of the seller.247 Then, in
Matsushita v. Zenith, the Supreme Court downplayed the significance of
predatory-pricing conspiracies. The Matsushita Court believed that such conspiracies were “self-deterring” due to the heavy costs that failure imposed on
See Hern, supra note 232.
Press Release, Amazon, Kindle Fire HD and Kindle Fire HD 8.9″ Now Available for
Pre-Order (May 23, 2013), phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1823563 (announcing that Amazon offers over 1.2 million e-books at
$9.99 or less, and over 650,000 at $4.99 or less.); Hern, supra note 232.
240 Hern, supra note 232.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Hiltzik, supra note 9.
244 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 34.
245 For example, the framers of the Sherman Act seemed concerned that low prices were
harmful because they put small businesses competing for trusts at a competitive disadvantage. Id.; see also PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 18 (quoting a senator as saying that prices should be fair, not cheap).
246 Wildfang, supra note 18, at 327.
247 Id.
238
239
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the conspirators.248 Since Matsushita, predatory pricing has been considered
rare and self-correcting, because the predator-seller must: first, sell products at
a loss for long enough to drive competitors out of business permanently; and,
second, have a reasonable expectation that he will be able to raise prices at a
later time above the competitive market level and, thereby, profit.249
Amazon argues that it did not engage in predatory pricing and that its incredible success in the e-book market is due to the fact that it was the first
company that successfully entered that market.250 Amazon’s innovative technology and marketing strategies251 should be rewarded by profits, not prosecuted. Amazon should argue that its monopoly control of the e-book market is
temporary and would not harm any market competitors.252 E-books exist in a
digital marketplace, a market that new entrants can enter easily.253 Distributing
e-books involves practically no marginal costs;254 therefore, in the e-book market, conspirators have less incentive, than they otherwise would in a traditional
market,255 to use monopoly power to raise prices and sell fewer units.
The price of a book should be what the market demands, but book pricing
has been inflated by the publishers; and Amazon has used those inflated prices
to seize the e-book market.256 It is important to distinguish between books that
are interchangeable (genre fiction, diet books, manuals, and etc.) and books for
which there are no substitutes, such as a book by your favorite author.257 Seth
Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595 (1986).
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224–26
(1993).
250 Martinez, supra note 87.
251 See
The Walmart of the Web; Amazon, ECONOMIST (Oct. 1, 2011),
http://commcns.org/1cld5wY (explaining how Amazon rose to become one of the most
successful online retailers).
252 See Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224–25 (describing the duration and injury requirements).
253 New entrants in the e-book market can easily find a wide selection of self-publishing
companies, online e-book creation tools, and other valuable resources that will guide them
through the entire process of self-publishing an e-book. David Carnoy, How to Self-Publish
an eBook, CNET REVIEWS (June 1, 2012), http://commcns.org/PGo9uX.
254 Godin, supra note 86 (“On one hand, the marginal cost of delivering a single e[-]book
is close to zero. It might cost Amazon . . . a dime to transmit it, but it certainly costs the
publisher nothing.”).
255 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust
Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 249 (1987).
256 See The Walmart of the Web; Amazon, supra note 251 (“Amazon’s pricing strategy
also reflects one of the firm’s core beliefs, which is that cheap stuff makes customers cheerful. Call it the Walmart of the web.”); Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, E-Book Prices Prop Up
Print Siblings, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2011, at B1 (“Even as readers grow more comfortable
with digital books, some continue to question why so many of the most popular new ebooks are priced so high.”).
257 Godin, supra note 86.
248
249
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Godin, founder of The Domino Project, argues that the natural price for ebooks is very low.258 For example, many self-publishing kindle authors will sell
their books for a few dollars.259 Self-publishing authors claim that they have
watched their sales multiply many times when they reduced their prices from
$2.99 to $0.99.260
Amazon might also defend its practices in e-books by pointing out that monopolies affect digital products differently than they do physical items.261 The
printing and distribution of print books is costly.262 Every extra book printed
and sent to stores presents a risk that those costs will not be recouped if the
book remains unsold. Meanwhile, the marginal cost to distribute e-books is
only a few cents,263 and entering the e-book market as a distributor requires
little more than buying a domain name.264 Under these conditions, Amazon’s
opportunity to use its dominant market position to engage in competitive pricing was only viable if the company was working with a longer-term strategy to
somehow keep new competitors from entering the e-book market after raising
prices back to profitable levels.
Ultimately, the case against Amazon for antitrust in e-book sales depends on
an understanding of Amazon’s strategy.265 Amazon intended for e-books to
replace print books as the standard medium, and it sought to make $9.99 the
standard price for e-books. 266 Amazon’s internal strategy in e-books is somewhat inscrutable, and when Charlie Rose, in 2009, asked Amazon founder and
CEO Jeff Bezos to describe his outstanding talent, he said it was his focus on
the long term and a “willingness to be misunderstood.”267 Amazon was operating within the law, if the company was pricing e-books below its price paid to
publishers in order to push customers to consider e-books generally. Then,
once the market for digital books grew sufficiently, Amazon could begin to

Id.
Rebecca Ratcliffe, Kindle the Fire to Self-Publishing, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://commcns.org/1cld9Nf.
260 Mathew Ingram, Future of Media: The Rise of the Million-Selling Kindle Author,
GIGAOM (June 20, 2011, 9:19 AM), http://commcns.org/1ilJKAZ.
261 See generally Asher Meir, Is Amazon’s Low Pricing Competitive or a Real Monopoly?, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 20, 2012), http://commcns.org/1fgn81m.
262 Alan Finder, The Joys and Hazards of Self-Publishing on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2012, at B8.
263 Id.
264 Suw Charman-Anderson, Libiro: New Ebook Store for Indie Authors, FORBES (Sept.
17, 2013), http://commcns.org/1cEYMnG.
265 Farhad Manjoo, The Stupidest Thing Apple Ever Did, SLATE (July 11, 2013),
http://commcns.org/1hYMW7s.
266 Id.
267 Auletta, supra note 134.
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charge higher prices.268 However, if Amazon sought to eliminate or inhibit
competition by gaining the majority of U.S. e-book customers, and if Amazon
then increased prices once it had locked-in its customer-base, then Amazon
would be guilty of antitrust violations.
VI.

ANTITRUST POLICY SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO
RECOGNIZE MARKET FAILURES AND AVOID MAKING
MATTERS WORSE

The contrasts between the legal liabilities of Amazon and Apple show an
important need for an extensive policy analysis before the decision is made to
prosecute an antitrust case. Anti-competitive behavior must be considered in
light of the surrounding circumstances.269 Prosecutions, such as that against
Apple, should be reined in. The Justice Department could adjust the policies
that guide prosecutors to account for the discord between the prosecution of
Apple and the inability to address Amazon’s prior “damage” to competition. A
reasonably narrow rule could be added to the Antitrust Division Manual that,
in the case of a significant justification of a possible market failure, which is
not addressed by the Sherman Act as currently interpreted, prosecutors should
decide against pressing antitrust charges.270 The negative consequence of punishing the success of lawful businesses is the highly publicized precedents that
have wide effects on economic efficiency. 271 These consequences outweigh the
harm from the missed prosecution of a bad actor.272 Prosecutors should incorporate the underlying logic of the second-best tradeoffs defense into their decisions to prosecute Sherman Act violations.273
Additionally, Congress should address this issue through statute. It would
not be necessary, and may do more harm than good, to amend the Sherman
268 Id. (“[A] close associate of Bezos puts it more starkly: ‘What Amazon really wanted
to do was make the price of e-books so low that people would no longer buy hardcover
books. Then the next shoe to drop would be to cut publishers out and go right to authors.’”).
269 Timothy J. Brennan, “High-Tech” Antitrust: Incoherent, Misguided, Obsolete, or
None of the Above? Comments on Crandall-Jackson and Wright, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG. 423,
432 (2011), available at http://commcns.org/1maGSfq (“We should use all of the specific
information that is available at the time in assessing an alleged anticompetitive merger or
practice, including whether it would suppress or promote innovation.”).
270 Bryan Chaffin, The DOJ Only Wants to Control (and Limit) Apple’s iTunes, MAC
OBSERVER (Aug. 2, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://commcns.org/1hWt6cg (commenting that the
DOJ’s remedy against Apple “hands unprecedented power to Apple’s competitors”).
271 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984).
272 Id. at 3.
273 Hammer, supra note 215, at 882–91 (identifying the elements that a defendant must
show to make the intramarket second-best defense and discussing the intramarket secondbest defense).
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Act.274 Instead lawmakers may amend the Tunney Act, which regulates the Justice Department’s practices with regard to prosecuting and settling antitrust
cases.275 The Tunney Act already requires that any entered consent decree must
be “in the public interest” as determined by the court that enters the settlement.276 An amendment could add the additional requirement that the court
must find that the circumstances of the market, as it existed prior to the alleged
antitrust, represented a healthier competitive process than the market circumstances that resulted from the alleged antitrust. This would sufficiently describe
the vast majority of antitrust claims, leaving out only those prosecutions that
punish behaviors that arguably led to an improvement in competition in the
relevant market, such as that of Apple and the Publisher Defendants.
Clearly this proposal is not a perfect solution. One problem is that, limited
by the bounds of the Tunney Act, it would only regulate proposed consent decrees and would have no direct effect on the ability of prosecutors to pursue
cases in court.277 However, if such a change was made, perhaps courts would
take note of Congress’s intent to regulate antitrust prosecutions in this manner
and allow the change to influence case law at the margins. The lion’s share of
antitrust cases are settled by defendants—as were the cases against each of the
Publisher Defendants—and this amendment would have created a possible
barrier to those settlements, possibly forcing the Justice Department to follow
through to a trial or else drop the charges.278
If lawmakers go beyond the Tunney Act and seek to amend the Sherman
Act substantially, they should be mindful of the precedents undergirding the
law. Standing alone, § 1’s first sentence supports vast volumes of law and
analysis, and it impacts practically every segment of the economy. So far,
Congress has refrained from altering the substance of either of the Sherman
Act’s sections.279 The Sherman Act’s framers’ contradictory and antiquated
274 See THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 100, at 6, 177 (explaining that proposals
for antitrust legislation, which focus on preventing mergers and enhancing enforcement
powers, is misplaced, because there “is no reason to believe that the destruction of national
wealth involved in the enactment of these bills or other recent proposed legislation would be
compensated by any social gain”).
275 See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, 1706,
1709 (1974).
276 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).
277 Id.; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1459–60 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The
court’s authority to review the [consent] decree depends entirely on the government’s exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place.”).
278 Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Macmillan Settles Antitrust Case over E-Book Pricing,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2013), http://commcns.org/1e8HvBo.
279 However, amendments to the Sherman Act have been introduced. For example, Senator Herb Khol proposed a bill to reverse the per se rule against vertical price-fixing, which
was established by the holding in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
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statements suggest that few of them were certain of the specific legal and economic implications of the law when it was passed.280 Thus, today’s lawmakers
should be cautious when proposing to change the Sherman Act’s substance.
Such changes could have numerous unintended consequences when interpreted
by courts alongside the existing jurisprudence.281
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Justice Department’s successful case against Apple was based on clear
precedents backed by a challenging case for Apple to maintain. As the law
stands, there is little room for a defendant like Apple, in a case of a per se antitrust violation, to justify the existence of a harmful monopoly or other market
failure. Therefore, Apple’s primary defense strategy was to contest the factual
basis for the Justice Department’s case: that Apple knowingly participated in a
conspiracy for the purpose of raising e-book prices.282 Nonetheless, Apple also
pressed against the policy argument, which was being argued by the prosecution—as a result of Apple’s deals with the publishers, consumers were ultimately harmed by higher prices on e-books.283
For years, Amazon distressed the book publishing industry, authors, and
brick-and-mortar stores with its insistence on charging $9.99 for most bestselling e-books, but that is not a crime. Nor is it a justification in any yet recognized legal sense for Apple’s subsequent deals with the Publishers that ended
the “$9.99 problem.” Although it is conceivable that Amazon’s internal strategy was consistent with a plan to benefit indirectly from pricing e-books at a
loss, there is insufficient evidence that Amazon intended to raise the prices on
e-books at a later date. Doing so would immediately draw in competitors, who
have little or no barriers to entry, and who would quickly eat up market share.
Amazon’s strategy was most likely a means to expand adoption of the proprie-

U.S. 877 (2007). See Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2011, S.75, 112th Cong.
§ 2(b)(1) (2011).
280 PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 17. But see Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, supra note 45, at 7 (“Congress intended the courts
to implement (that is, to take account in the decision of cases) only that value we would
today call consumer welfare. To put it another way, the policy the courts were intended to
apply is the maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction.”).
281 Am. Bar Ass’n, Comments Regarding the Oil and Gas Industry Act of 2006, S. 2557,
109th Cong., at 1, 3 (Apr. 2006), available at http://commcns.org/MXhIkP (last visited Aug.
20, 2013).
282 Sam Gustin, Apple Found Guilty in E-Book Price Fixing Conspiracy Trial, TIME
(July 10, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fNFcWs.
283 See Exhibit DX-434, supra note 203 (showing, by a chart, that the average price that
consumers paid for e-books has decreased steadily since April 1, 2010).
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tary Kindle Store format for e-books, thus “locking” customers’ libraries of
purchased in to the format for good. Even this theory is only supported by inference, and is far too weak to support a Sherman Act § 2 case against Amazon.
But, as discussed above in the previous section, perhaps there should be an
additional procedural check put in place in the Tunney Act to protect antitrust
defendants who may argue that their actions are justified by significant market
failures. Courts have produced voluminous law addressing just these questions
and have reached some stable guidelines for reasonable limits for antitrust cases, along with per se analysis for certain irredeemable practices. Changing the
Sherman Act itself may do more harm than good, by affecting the existing jurisprudential standards in unintended ways. Instead, the problems of Apple’s
prosecution can be addressed cautiously with narrow changes to ways that federal prosecutors conduct their cases. Either the Justice Department, or Congress through an amendment to the Tunney Act, can add the requirement that
prosecutors consider the possibility that it may not be in the public interest to
prosecute supposedly anticompetitive practices like those of Apple when they
result in some form of arguably positive effects on the relevant market.

